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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1919-1920.

VI.

III 1

~'l'ROAC'l'IVE CIVIL LEGISLATION

IVE of the corporations which fought in vain against exercises
of the police power profited nothing from their grasp at the
obligation-of-contracts clause. In Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co. v. Wisconsin 2 the contract relied on was a clause in the charter
of a street railroad imposing on it the duty to keep the space between
at?-d near its tracks in good repair "with the same material as the
city shall have last used to pave or repave these spaces and the
street previous to such repairs, unless the railway company and
the board of public works of said city shall agree upon some other
material, and said company shall then use the material agreed
upon." The company contended that "its obligation is, in any event,
limited to repaving with such material as the city had last used
between the rails." Mr. Justice Brandeis, for all the court except
Justices Pitney and McReynolds, answered : "This would put upo:a
the city the burden of paving the whole street in case of any innovation in paving save by agreement of the company and the city.
It is not a reasonable construction of the ordinance." This makes
the phrase "these spaces and the street" equivalent to "these spaces
or the street." The pavement required of the company was the
same as that which the city had laid on all the street but the railway
zone. The complaint of the road that the expense would reduce
its income below a reasonable return on its investment was answered
by saying that "there is no warrant in law for the contention that
merely because its business fails to earn full six per cent upon the
value of the property used, the co111pany can escape either obligations voluntarily assumed or burdens imposed in the ordinary exercise of the police power."
The contract relied on in Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper
Sandusky3 was the statute in force in 1889 when the company's

F

1
For the previous installments reviewing cases on Miscellaneous Federal
Powers, Regulation of Commerce, Taxation, Police Power and Eminent
Domain, see 19 MxcH. L. REV. 1-24, n7-151 (November and December, 1920).
2
252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1920), 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 138.
1
252 U. S. 173, 40 Sup. <;t. 104 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REV. 139.
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franchise was granted and accepted. This declare\} that the "mode"
of use of the streets "shall be such as shall be agreed upon between
the municipal authorities of the . . . village and the company, but
if they cannot agree, the probate court of the county shall direct
what the mode of use shall be." In l8g6 the state law was amended
so that it forbade the construction or maintenance of wires, fixtures
and appliances for conducting electricity without the consent of the
municipality. In 1913 the company took down certain poles and
wires used for lighting the streets. The Supreme Court held that
it could not restore these or erect new additional ones without
obtaining the consent of the city; but it interpreted the injunction
granted below as not applying to the repair and replacing of poles
and wires which had been continuously used for commercial lighting and affirmed the judgment of the state court with the qualification, "restrained to the scope of its opinion, as we have interpreted
it." The case thus rests on the abandonment by the company of
its rights under the ordinance of 1889 in its poles and wires used
for street lighting. The statute of 1896, requiring the consent of
·the city, is sustained as a reasonable exercise of the police power;
such modification of the company's rights as it may suffer from
the decree of the state court is said "not to constitute an impairing
of the obligation of its contract with the state or village." In Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Police CourP the only contract right adduced
against a municipal command to sprinkle the streets was the general
authority conferred by the franchise to operate a road in the streets ;
but the ordinance was found to be within the police power, and the
police power was said to dominate the right of the company under
its franchise to use the streets.
In two cases the contracts unsuccessfully relied on were with private persons rather than with some public authority. Munday v.
Wisconsin Trust Co. 5 sustained the state court in holding a deed
invalid because the grantee was a foreign corporation which had
failed to file the requisite papers with the state in which the land
lay. As the obstructing statute was in force before the transaction
in question, the court reminded the aggrieved litigant that "the
settled doctrine is that the contract clause applies only to legislation
• 251 U. S.
•252

22, 40 Sup. Ct. 79 (1919), 19 M1cH. L. RF.v. 1j9.
U. S. 499, 40 Sup. Ct. 365 (1920), 19 MICH. L. RF.v. 144.
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subsequent in time to the contract alleged to have been impaired."
u'efore the suit began the grantee had obtained a license to do business and hold property within the state, but the state court had
held that this did not validate prior invalid transactions. This was
said by the Supreme Court· to be wholly a matter of state law and
to involve no right under the Constitution or I:tws of the United
States.
In Producers' Transportation Co; v. Railroad Commission6 the
plaintiff had previously fixed its rates by private contract and now
insisted that it was not a common carrier; but the court disagreed
with it and allowed the state railroad commission to take it in hand.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter reiterated the well-settled rule that "a
common carrier cannot, by making contracts for future transportation or by mortgaging its property or pledging its income, prevent
or postpone the exertion ~y the state of the power to regulate the
carrier's rates and practices." To make the matter certain, he added:
"Nor does the contract clause of the Constitution impose any obstacle
to the assertion of that power."
In three cases the contract clause was grasped not as a mere
makewei~ht but as the only hope against legislation concededly
within the general police power. In Bank of Oxford v. Love1 it
was recognized that the charter of a bank was a contract, but the
provision that the business shall be controlled by the stockholders
under such rules and regulations as the company may see fit to
adopt was held not to confer any immunity from a statute requiring
periodic examination by the state banking department and the imposition of moderate fees for the maintenance of the scrutinizing
agency.
In Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham8 the plaintiff attempted
unsuccessfully to spell out an exclusive franchise from a provision
in its charter that the town "warrants that it will, by its proper
authoritie~, provide for the full and free use of its streets, lanes,"'
etc. Mr. Justice Clarke called the contention "fatuous and futile:'
and declared that ''grants of rights and priyileges by a state or
municipality are strictly construed and whatever is not tmequivo• 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920), 19 MICH. L. RJ,:v. 137.
'250 U. S. 6o3, 40 Sup. Ct. 22 (1919).
"253 U. S. 193, 40 Sup. Ct. 453 (1920).
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cally granted is withheld; nothing passes by implication." The
alleged federal question was found so frivolous that the appeal
from the court below was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A similar summary disposition was given to the appeal in Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Ohio T. & L. Co. 0 A waterpower company which had been granted the right of eminent domain
was told that it acquired no exclusive right to any particular lands
by filing with its articles of incorporation a plan specifying the
places where it planned to erect dams. "The contention of plaintiff," observes Mr. Justice McKenna, "is certainly a bold on-=, and
seemingly erects into a legal principle that unexecuted intention, or
partly executed intention, has the same effect as executed intention,
and that the declaration of an enterprise gives the same right as its
consummation." The acts of a competing company of which ihe
frustrated plaintiff complained were held not acts that might be
attributed to the state as an impairment of plaintiff's contract. No
wrong was done the plaintiff by incorporating other power companies under the same general law or by sanctioning: the transfer
of the rights and franchises of a corporation older than itself to one
younger.
The contract clause was one of the supports picked out by the·
successful lighting company in I~os Angeles v. l~os Angeles Gas &
Electric Corporation,1° and figured at least indirectly in the decision.
The case held that the city could not compel the company to remove
poles and wires to make room for a competing municipal system.
Since the attempt was not a valid police measure and was un:.iccompanied by any proffer of compensation, it was held to be inhibited
by the Fourt-=enth Amendment. But the property rights thus
wrongfully threatened seem to be regarded as not confined to property acquired for the purpose of exercising the powers conferred
by the franchise, but to embrace also property rights in the franchise itself. To quote Mr. Justice McKenna:
"A franchise conveys rights, and if th-=ir exercise could
be prevented or destroyed by a simple declaration of a municipal council, they would he infirm indeed in tenure and
'252 U.S. 388, 40 Sup. Ct. 404 (1920).
10
251 U. S. 32, 40 Sup. Ct. 76 (1919), 19 MrcH. L. Rev. 139·

Pitney and Clarke dissent.

Justice;;
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substance. It is to be remembered that they came into existence by compact, having, therefore, its sanction, urged by
reciprocal _benefits, and are attended and can only be exercised by expenditure of money, making them a matter of
investments and property, and entitled as such against being
taken without the proper process of law-the payment of
compensation."
The distinction between a breach of contract and an impairment
of its obligation finds illustration in Hays v. Port of Seattle,1 1
already consider'=d in the section on eminent domain. Back in 1896
the plaintiff made a contract· with the state for excavating part of
Seattle harbor, the state engaging "to hold the lands subject to the
operation of the contract pending its execution, and subject to the
ultimate lien of the contra.ctor thereon." After long delay and disagreement as to plans, the state in 1913 turned the property over to
the Port of Seattl~, which proceeded to go ahead with the excavation on its own account. This was held to be nothing but a possible
breach by the state of its contract with the plaintiff, Mr. Justice
Pitney observing:
"Supposing the contract had not been abandoned by complainant himself or terminated by his long delay, its obligation remained·as before, and formed the measure of his right
to recover from the state for the damages sustained."
As th-:! state by general law provided ample opportunity to sue and
to collect a judgment against it, and the infliction on the plaintiff,
if any, was for a recognized public purpose, an injunction was
denied and the plaintiff left to his action for damages.
Two of the tax cases already treated dealt also with objections
to retroactive legislation. The plaintiff in Okla.lioma R'J'· Co. v.
Severns Paving Co. 12 was told that its charter obligation to pave a
portion of its right of way implied no agreement on the part of the
city that prevented a special assessment on the railroad right of
way to defray part of the expense of paving the main portion oI
n
12

251 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I49·
251 U. S. 104, 40 Sup.. Ct. 73 (1919), I9 MICH. L. IU:v. 129.
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the street. Ward v. Love Count'f~ reiterated the point established
earlier14 that a tax exemption of .Indian lands granted by Congress
was a property right which could not, consistently with due process
of law, be taken away by withdrawal of the exemption. This was
not directly in issue in the principal case, as the dispute was over
the question whether the taxes which· the Indians sought to get
back had been paid voluntarily. Another case in which a tax exemption, concededly contractual, was held to cover the particular property in question is Central of Georgia R)'. Co. v. Wright.u This was
a rehearing of a portion of a case16 decided the preceding term.
The opinion is merely a postscript to its predecessor and cannot be
understood independently.17
VII.

IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME

The unanimity with which the Supreme Court sustained convictions under the Espionage Law in 19i8-1919 is broken in upon in
1919-1920. The minority judges, however, do not fully indicate
how much of their dissent is based on the First AmendtlJ.ent and
how much goes only to the propriety of the convictions under the
terms of the statute and the general canons of criminal law. The
22
253 U. S. 17, 40 Sup. Ct. 419 (1920), 19 MICH. L. ~v. 133. To tho!
same effect is Broadwell v. Carter County, 253 U.S. 25, 40 Sup. Ct. 422 (1920).
11
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565 (1912).
15
250 U. S. 519, 40 Sup. Ct. I (1919).
18
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 248 U. S. 525, 39 Sup. Ct. 181
(1919), 14 AM. Poi,. Ser. ~v. 63.
"For notes on Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia, 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup.
Ct. u7 (1919), 14 AM. Por.. SCL ~v. 61, holding that a public utility can not
by contract with its patrons defeat the power of rate regulation, and Columbus
Ry. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349 (1919).
13 AM. P~r.. Ser. ~v. 632, holding that a company cannot escape from a
clause in its franchise restricting the fare to be charged, notwithstanding the
increase of operating co~ts incident to conditions produced by the war, see
33 HARV. L. ~- 97, n6. The latter case is considered in 18 MxcH. L. ~.
320. For discussions of the power to fix rates by contract in the grant of a
franchise and the power of state authorities to permit an increase of
rates as against a contract between the company and a city, and other
phases of the same general problem, see Charles K Burdick, "Regulating
Franchise Rates," 29 YALE L. J. 58g, N. C. Collier, "Change of Rates of Public_
Utility Which Have Been Fixed by Franchise Ordinance," 90 CENT. L. J.
42, Clarence Dallam, "The Public Utility and the Public Highway," 6 VA.
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o~ense in the cases was committed by publishing or distributing
literature that contained unflattering remarks about the motives and
justificatio~s for _American participation in the war or that covertly
or directly encouraged or advised restraint from actions that wculd
aid in its prosecution. In .Abrams v. United States' 8 it was laid
down by Mr. Justice Clarke for the majority that the only question
before the court was whether "there was some evidence, competent
and substantial, before the jury, fairly tending to sustain the verdict." There was denunciation of the President ·as vehement as any
in a journal devotedly dedicated to uncomplimentary shafts in that
direction. The court, howev~r, refrained from passing on the propriety of the convictions on the counts charging "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of government of the
United States," or language "intended to bring that government
into contem~t, scorn, contumely, and disrepute." Mr. Justice Clarke
remarked that "a technical distinction may perhaps be taken between

L. REV. 35, Godfrey Goldmark, "The Struggle for Higher Pu}?lic Utility
Rates Because of War-time Costs,'' 5 CoRNEI.L L. Q. 227, A. Raymond Sanborn, "The Power of the Public Utilities Commissions to Alter· Rates," 13
MAINF. L. REV. I, and editorial notes in 20 Cor.uM. L. REv. 704, 5 IowA L. B.
265, I8 MicH. L. REv. 806, 4 MINN. L. REv. 526, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 280, and 26
W. VA. L. Q. 67. .
For a discussion of United Railroads v. San Francisco, 249 U. S. 5I7, 39
Sup. Ct. 361 (I9I9), I4"AM. PoL. Sci. R1w. 6o, holding that a statute forbidding two railroads to occupy the same street does not enter into a franchise as
a promise on the part of the municipal granter not to compete with the
grantee, see 33 HARV. L. REV. 576, 614. The effect on a contract with a city
for reduced fares for workmen of a statute prohibiting discrimination is considered in 29 YALE L. J. 563. The retroactive effect of soldiers' and sailors'
relief acts is discussed in 4 MINN. L. REv. 353; the amendment of statutes of
limitation, in 29 YALE L. J. 9I; and the retroactive taking away of a right of
action for wrongful death in another state, in 33 HAR\'. L. RF.v. 727.
13
250 U. S. 6I6, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (I9r9). See Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,~
DOM oF SPEECH (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), Chapter 3, "A
Contemporary State Trial", 33 HARV. L. REv. 747, Edward S. Corwin, "Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment'', 30 YALE L. J. 48,
"Constitutional Law in 191!)-1920, 14 AM. Por.. Scr. REv. 635, at pp. 655-658,
M. G. Wallace, "Constitutionality of Sedition Laws", 6 VA. L. REv. 385, John
H. Wigmore, "Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of
Thuggery in War-time and Peace-time", 14 II.L. L. REv. 539, and notes in 20
CoLUM. L. REv. go, 33 HARV. L. REv. 442, 474. 14, ILL. L. REv. 6o1, 18 MICH.
L. REv. 236, 5 VA. L. REG. n. s. 7I5, 29 YAI.E L. J. 337, and 30 YALE L. J. 68.
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disloyal and abusive language applied to the form of our government or language intended to bring the form of our government
into contempt and disrepute, and language of like character and
intended to produce like results directed against the President and
Congress, the agencies through which that form of government must
function in time of war." But he did not press the point, as he
found the language fully sufficient to warrant conviction on the
counts charging utterances intended to provoke resistance to the
United States in time of war and advocating the curtailment of production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to the
prosecution of the war. This was enough to sustain the sentences,
as they did not exceed those that might be imposed for conviction
on these counts alone. Among. the exhortations of the defendants
were the following:
"Yes, friends, there is qnly one enemy of the workers of
the world, and that is CAPITALISM. . . .
With the money which you have loaned or are going to
loan them they will make bullets not only for the Germans
but also for the Workers' Soviets of Russia. 1Vorkers in
the ammunition factories, yoit are producing bullets, ·bayonets,
cannon, to murder not onl:v the Germans but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom . . . .
Workers, our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be
a general strike.
Do not let the government scare you with their wild punishment in prisons, hanging and shooting. \Ve must not and
will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia. Workers, up
to fight.
Know_. yoi, lovers of freedom, that in order to save tl;,c.
Russian revolution we must keep the armies of the allii>d
countries busy at home.
We, the toilers of America, who believe in real liberty,
shall pledge ourselves, in case the United States will partidpate in that bloody conspiracy against Russia, to create so
great a distttrbance that the atttocrats of America shall be
compelled to keep their armies at home, and not be able to
spare any for Rttssia."
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~or the majority Mr. Justice Clarke declared that "while the immediate occasion for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the
part of th~ defe~dant alien anarchists, may have been resentment
caused by our government sending troops into Russia as a strategic
operation against the Germans on the eastern battle front, yet the
plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme
crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped,
revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrasing and if
possible defeating the military plans of the government in Europe."
~e had earlier laid down that "it will not do to say . . . that the
only intent of these defendants was to prevent injury to the Russian cause," for "men must" be held to have intended, and to be
accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce."
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes is difficult to deal
with from the standpoint pf constitutional Jaw, as it does not make
clear how much it is based on the Constitution. The learned Justice
conceded that defendants urged curtailment in the production of
things necessary to the prosecution of the war, and that one of the
leaflets if published for this purpose might be punishable. He recognized ~!so that "intent" is at common law satisfied by knowledge
of facts from which common experience shows that the consequences
would follow. He adheres to his previously expressed conviction
that "the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that
it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United
States constitutionally may seek to prevent." This recognizes that
speech which produces such danger is punishable even though the
danger is not intended in the strict sense of the word. But Mr.
Justice Holmes finds the danger lacking in the present case, for he
says:
"Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would
present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder
the success of the government arms or have any appreciable
tendency to do so."

This seems to be the nub of the dissent so far as it goes on constitutional grounds. The majority allow the jury to infer sufficient
danger from the circumstances. 'The minority thi~k the inference
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unjustified because of the silliness of the leaflet and the unimportance of 'its authors. To them the circumstances do not as a mere
matter of inference show th?.t degree of danger which is necessary
before freedom of speech can be curtailed consistently with the
First Amendment. The opinion at this point is plainly concerned
with the constitutional issue, for it follows the introduction :
"The power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than
in time of peace, because war opens dangers that do not
exist at other times.
But as against dangers peculiar to war. as against others,
the principle of the right of free speech is always the same.
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent
to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit
to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cann_ot forbid all_ effort to c.hange
the mind of the country."
On the question of the interpretation of the statute the dissenting
opinion takes the position that "encouraging resistance" is not satisfied by encouraging abstinence from assistance, and that "intent"
must be construed in the strict and accurate sense and not as vaguely
used in ordinary legal discussion. The inference from the opinion
is that the First Amendment requires either intent in the sense of
aim, motive, or object, or else a clearer, nearer danger from the
words used than could be thought by a reasonable man to be present
in the principal case. There is also the suggestion that th_e First
Amendment limits the degree of punishment for speech conc<:dedly
punishable, though it may be that Mr. Justice Holmes has the dueprocess clause of the Fifth Amendment in mind when he says:
"In this case sentences of twenty years' imprisonment
have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I
believe the defendants had as much right to publish as the
Government has to publish the Constitution of the United
States now vainly invoked by them. Even if I am technically
wrong and enough can be squeezed from these poor and puny
anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper; I will
add, even if what I think the necessary intent were shown;
the most nominal punishment seems to me all that could pos-
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sibly be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to
suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed
that they avow-a creed that I believe to be the creed of
ignorance and immaturity when honestly held, as I see no
reason to doubt that it was held here, but which, although
made the subject of examination at the trial, no one has a
right even to consider in dealing with charges before this
Court."
The concluding· clause may refer to Mr. Justice Clarke's remark
on ''this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the part of the
defendant alien anarchists." That the difference of opinion amor..g
the judges goes back to a difference in fundamental faiths as to
what is most important in the process of government is evident
from the concluding paragraph of the dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice Holmes reveals not a little of what constitutional interpretation
owes to the fundamental faiths of the judges when he says:·
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result with all your heart,
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away
all opposition. To allow opposition by speeeh seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says
that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your pow~r
or your premises. But when men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our
system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against
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attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immedi~te interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country. I wholly disagree with the
argument of the Government that the First Amendment left
th~ common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems
to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United
States through many years had shown its repentance for the
Sedition Act of 1798 (Act July 14, 1798, c. 73, I Stat. 596)
by repaying fines that it imposed. Only the emergency that
makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of
evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the
sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech.' Of course, I am speaking only of cxpre.;sions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were
uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the
Constitution of the United States."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, who joined in this dissent, wrote the dissenting opinion in Pierce v. United States,1° in which Mr. Justice
Holmes was again of the minority. This opinion is largely concerned with maintaining that the pamphlet distributed by the defendants did not contain false statements within the meaning of the
statute. In insisting that the question of the truth or falsity should
not have been left to the jury, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed:
"To hold that a jury may make punishable statements of
conclusions or of opinion, like those here involved, by declaring them to be statemeAts of facts ai;id to be false would
practically, de~y members of small political parties freedom
of discussion in times when feelings run high and the questions involved are deemed fundament~l." '
On the constitutional issue, the· dissenting opinion relied on the
conviction ·that the nature of the leaflet and the circumstances of
"251 U.S. 205, 40 Sup. Ct. 239 (1920).·
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its distribution were not such as to create any clear and present
danger of harmful results. It refers to the note of despair in the
offending tract, with its recognition of the hopelessness of protest
under the existing system and the irresistible military might of the
government, and says that "it is not conceivable that any man cf
ordinary intelligence and normal judgment would be induced"
thereby to commit offense and run the risk of the penalties. Mr.
Justice Brandeis closes by saying:
"The fundamental right of free men to strive for better
conditions through new legislation and new institutions will
not be preserved if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow
citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey
the existing law-merely because the argument presented
seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its
portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions,
unsound in reasoning and intemperate in language. No
objections more serious than these can, in my opinion, reasonably be made to the arguments presented in '1'he Price
We Pay.'"
Here, as in the Abrams case, the majority took the position that
whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate
result the substantive evils which concededly Congress may strive
to prevent "is a question for the jury to decide in view of all the
circumstances of the time and considering the place and manner
of distribution." Intent under the statute and under the Constitution is something that the jury may infer from probable consequences. The words that can he punished are those that have a
sufficiently dangerous tendency.
This is reiterated by Mr. Justice McKenna in the majority opinion
in Schaefer v. United States, 20 in which the defendants were convicted of publishing false statements with the intent of promoting
the success of the enemies of the United States. The gist of the
offending articles was that the motives of Great Britain in entering
the war were not so disinterested as they might have been, and that
the United States was bluffing and would never send an effective
""251 U.S. 4)6, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920). See 29 YALi;: L.

J. 677.
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army to the front. Mr. Justice Brandeis in dissenting insisted that
"men, judging in calmness . . . could not reasonably have said that
this coarse and . heavy humor immediately threatened the success
of recruiting." But Mr. Justice McKenna answered:
"Coarse, indeed, this was, and vulgar to us ; but it was
expected to produce, and it may be did produce, a different
effect upon its readers. To them its derisive contempt may
have been truly descriptive of American feebleness and
inability to combat Germany's prowess, and thereby chill
and check the ardency of patriotism and make it despair of
success, and in hopelessness relax energy both in preparation
and action. If it and the other articles . . . had not that
purpose, what purpose had they? Were they the mere expression of peevish discontent, aimless, vapid, and innocuous?
We cannot so conclude. We must take them at their word,
'as the jury did, and ascribe to them a more active and sinister
purpose. They were the publications of a newspaper, deliberately prepared, systematic, always of the same trend, more
specific in some instances, it may be, than in others. Their
effect, or the persons affected, could not be shown, nor was
it necessary. The tendency of the articles and their efficacy
were enough for the offense-their 'intent' and 'attempt,'
for those are the words of the act-and to have required
more would have made the law useless. It was passed in
precaution. The incidence of its violation might not be immediately seen, evil appearing only in disaster, the result of the
disloyalty engendered and the spirit of mutiny."
Mr. Justice Holmes joined in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis;
and Mr. Justice Clarke this time opposed the majority, but not on
constitutional grounds. The disagreement between the judges on
the constitutional issue comes down to a question of degree as to
the extent to which the court will allow the jury to surmise as to
the probable effect of the objectionable language. In all the cases
which have come before the Supreme Court the defendants were
preaching a gospel which, if acted upon, would be a drag on the
prosecution of the war. It seems safe to sum up the constitutional
law made by the decisions by saying that the First Amendment
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c<?nfers no immunity on such preaching even when confined to insinuation and innuendo. Yet it would be easy to think of much advocacy which would in fact hamper the conduct of the war much
more griev"ously than any words of those now serving sentence, but
which would never be thought punishable if coming from those
whose heart is in the popular place. It might be that in dealing
with prosecutions under such circumstances Mr. Justice Holmes
would find more agreement with his emphasis on the stricter meaning of "intent." He suggests hypothetical cases where patriots,
thinking that we were wasting money on aeroplanes or making
more cannon of a certain kind than necessary, successfully advocated a curtailment of prodtiction which turned out to hinder the
prosecution of the war.21
Two more espionage cases may be disposed of briefly. In O'c;·nnell v. United States2 2 the court was unanimous in sustaining the
Espionage Law and the Selective Service Law on the authority of
cases decided since the writ of error was sued out. The latter act
wa-s held to cover obstruction by non-official as well as official persons. No question of freedom of speech was involved. Stilson v.
United ~tates 23 did not review the evidence in any detail and adds
nothing to the cases already considered. On one of the counts
the government did not press the conviction; Justice Holmes and
Justice Brandeis thought that as the sentence was upon a general
verdict of guilty on both counts, the judgment should be reversed,
but none of their colleagues agreed. The case also held ·that the
trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment does
not include the privilege of peremptory challenges and that therefore defendants tried jointly cannot complain that the peremptory
challenges are no more numerous than when one is tried alone.
:n For general articles on freedom of speech, see Thomas F. Carroll,
"Freedom of Speech and the Press in the Federalist Period", I8 MICH. L.
REv. 615, Robert Ferrari, "Political Crime", 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 3o8, Fred B.
Hart, "Power of Government over Speech and Press", 29 YALE L. J. 410,
and Theodore Schroeder, "Political Crimes Defined", I8 M1cH. L. REv. 30.
Notes on various aspects of espionage and similar laws appear in 20 COLU,M.
L. Rsv. 222, 483, 700, I8 MICH. L. Rsv. 167, 7g8, and 6 VA. L. REv. 53.
"'253 U. S. 142, 40 Sup. Ct. 444 (1920).
"250 U. S. 583, 40 Sup. Ct. 28 (1919). See 29 YALE L. J. 363 for comment on the question of challenge involved in the case.
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In Stroud v. United States 24 there were contentions of double
jeopardy and self-incrimination. Mr. Stroud had been convicted
of murderi with a recommendation by the jury against capital punishment, which under the statute ·was binding. He asked for a new
trial and got it, and this time was convicted of murder, with no
recommendation by the jury as to sentence. Under the statute he
was sentenced to death. The court fomid that the first conviction
as well as the second was of murder in the first degree aJ?.d applied
the established rule that, since the defendant himself invoked the
action of the court which resulted in a second trial, he was not
thereby placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution.25 Allegations that the jury which brought in the second
verdict was not an impartial one, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were based on the facts that some of the prospective jurors
were present at preliminary proceedings at which statements prejudicial to the defendant were made and that the trial court refused
to transfer the case to another division of the district. Jurors from
the immediate vicinity were, however, excluded from the panel, and
Mr. Justice Day said that "matters of this sort are address.ed to the
discretion of the trial judge, and we see nothing in the record to
amount to abuse of discretion such as would authorize an appellate
court to interfere with the judgment." The complaint of selfincrimination was founded on the refusal of the trial court to grant
an application for a· return to the defendant of letters written by
him in prison and turned over by the warden to the district attorney. The court answered that the letters were voluntarily written,
that no threat or coercion was used to obtain them, nor were they
seized without process, and that having come into the possession of
the prison officials "under established practice, reasonably designed
to promote the discipline of the institution * * * there was neither
testimony required of the accused, nor unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of his constitutional rights."
"251 U. S. 15, 40 Sup. Ct. 50 (1919). See 5 VA. L. REG. n. s. 882, and
6 VA. L. REv. 457. For a rehearing on the question of chaltenge under the
statute, see Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 380, 40 Sup. Ct. 176 (1920) .
.. For discussions of double jeopardy, see 68 U. PA. L. REv. 70, on former
conviction for robbery as a bar to prosecutioµ for murder, and 6 VA. L. Ri;v.
372, on the same act as an offense against the state and a municipality.
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A different result was reached in Silverthorne Lwmber Co. v.
United States. 2 a Governmental officials raided the offices of a corporation after arresting its offic~rs, took away papers without any
search warrant, photographed them, retained photographs and
copies after returning the originals by order of the court upon application by the defendants, framed a new indictment on the basis of
the knowledge thus gained, and then obtained a subpoena to i;roduce the originals. For refusing to ob.;y the subpoena the corporation and one of its officers were found guilty of cont~mpt. The
Supreme Court held the subpoena unlawful as a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonabie searches and seizures.
As Mr. Justice Holmes puts it:
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly.
It is that, although of course its seizure was an outrage
which the Governm·~nt now regrets, it may study the pap:!rs
before it returns them, copy them, and may then us~ the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in
more regular form to produce them; i.hat the protection of
the Constitution covers the pliysical possession but not ..my
advantages that the Government can gain over the object of
its pursuit by doing the forbidden act."
It had already be:n held that papers so seized could not, after proper
objection, be laid directly before the grand jury. The idea that this
means only that two steps are required instead of one was .said to
reduce the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. Mr. Justic:!
Holmes then continues:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall
not be used at all. Of course, this does not mean that the facts
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge
of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
"252 U:. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 ( 1920). See 8 CAI.IF. L. Riv. 347, 20
Cor.. L. REV. 484, 33 HARV. L. Ri;v. 869, 4 MINN. L. Rr.v. 447, 6 VA. L. Ri;c.
n. s. 223, and 29 Y Ar.£ L. J. 553.
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Government's own wrong cannot be us-:!d by it in the way
proposed."
The protection of the decision was accorded to the corporation 2.S
well as to the aggrieved individual. \Vhile corporations are not
privileged to refuse to produce self-incriminating books and papers,
as individuals are, under a judicial blending of the search-andseizure and self-incrimination clauses of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, "the rights of a corporation against unlawful search
and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have
been achieved in another way." The case is rested on the Fourth
Amendment without any admixture of the Fifth with its privilege
against self-incrimination. Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice
Pitney dissented, but without opinion. 27
The clause of the Sixth Amendment entitling persons accused of
crime against the federal government to trial "by an impartial jury
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"
is involved in Gayon v. ,~fcCartl'liJl,2 5 though the issue does nnt
appear to have been raised by the accused. Gayon while in New
York conspired with persons in Texas, and the acts of his fellow
conspirators in Texas were declared to establish the jurisdiction of
the federal district court in Texas to indict Gayon. 29 This case and
another3° passed on procedural questions relating to removal of the
accused from one federal district to another. A third case31
involved -similar questions of procedure m arrest for extradition
to a foreign country.32
21
For discussions of self-incrimination, see A. M. Kidd, "The Right to
Take Finger-prints, Measurements and Photographs", 8 CALIF. L. REv. 25,
D. 0. McGovney, "Self-Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimony'', 5 IowA
L. Bur.L. 175, Roy Cleasey Merrick, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as to Charges of Contempt", 14 ILL. L. REv. 171, a note in 8 CALIF. L.
REv. 241 on powers exercised under the federal Trade Commission Act, and
a note in 14 Ir.r.. L. REv. 644 on self-incrimination under the National Prohibition Act.
03
252 U. S. 171, 40 Sup. Ct. 244 (19w).
20
For question of venue for trial when blow is in one county and death
in another, see 20 Cor.UM. L. REY. 619, and 33 HARV. L. REY. 843, 863.
30
Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339, 40 Sup. Ct. 537 (1920).
31
Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 40 Sup. Ct. 347 (1920).
02
Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376, 40 Sup. Ct. 388 (1920), held that a
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JURISDIC'l'ION AND PRoc:EouRF. OF CouR'I'S

'(he

E~tent

of Federal Judicial Power

An attempt by a -citizen of New Jersey to sue that state in an
original proceeding in the Supreme Court of the United States was
readily frustrated in Duhne v. N eu1 J ersey.83 The bill was brought
to enjoin the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. The only
possible ground for starting such a proceeding in the Supreme
Court was that the suit was one in which state is a party. But
the court pointed out through the Chief Justice that the third section of Article III, which describes the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, ''relates solely to the grounds of federal jurisdiction" conferred in the preceding section, "and hence solely deals
with cases in which the original jurisdiction of this court may be
resorted to in the exercise of the judicial power as previously
given." Since it is well settled that the federal judicial po,~er does
not embrace a suit brought by a citizen against a state without its
consent, the contention of the plaintiff was said to come "to the
proposition that the clause relied upon provides for the exerdse by
this court of original jurisdiction in a case where no federal judicial
power is conferred." Permission to file the bill was therefore refused.
Whether the action was one against the federal government, in so
far as it sought to enjoin federal officers, was not considered, inasmuch as the action against those officers had no claim to be brought
originally in the Supreme Court, and the effort necessarily fell flat

a

soldier in the army charged with the murder of a civilian is within the jurisdiction of state courts even in time of war, since the Articles of War do not
clearly make the jurisdiction of courts martial exclusive.
For discussions of the Court-martial system, see S. T. Ansell, "Military
Justice'', 5 CoRNnL L. Q. r, George Gleason Bogert, "Courts-Martial: Criticisms and Proposed Reform", 5 CoRNJU.L L. Q. 18, and Edmund M. Morgan,
"Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under the Articles of
War", 4 MINN. L. REv. 79, and1 "The Existing Court-Martial System and the
Ansell Army Articles", 29 Y AL'S L. J. 52.
See 18 MICH. L. REv. 810 for discussion of question whether a criminal
statute is void for indefiniteness; 33 HARV. L. REv. 449, 473, · for differing
penalties for men and women under equal protection of the laws ; and 6 VA.
L. REv. for imprisonment for non-payment of alimony.
13
251 U.S. 3u, 40 Sup. Ct. 154 (1920). See 5 VA. L. REG; n. s. 88r, and
29 YAL"S L. J. 471.
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wJ:ien it was determined that the plaintiff could not hale the state
before that court.31
An effor~ by t~e Secretary of the Treasury to resist proceedings
brought against him in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia~ on the ground that the suit was one against the United
States, met with defeat in Houston v. Ormes.35 The proceeding
was one by an attorney to establish an equitable lien for her fees in
a fund in the treasury of the United States appropriated to pay a
claim found by the Court of Claims to be due her client. The client
h~d been made a party and had appeared and unsuccessfully
defended. This was held to get rid of the objection that debts due
from the United States have no situs at the seat of government and
that therefore the decree against the secretary in favor of the attorney could not protect the government from subsequent suit by the
client. The federal statt\te forbidding the assignment of claiw.s
against the government was put to one side as not standing in the
way of assignment by operatiol}. of law ·after the claim has been
allowed. ~his left only the question whether the suit to establish
a lien on the fund was a suit against the United States. As to this,
Mr. Justjce Pitney said:
"But since the fund in ·question has been appropriated by
act of Congress for payment to a specified person in satisfaction of a finding of the Court of Claims, it is clear that
the officials of the Treasury are charged with the ministerial
duty to make payment on demand to the person designated.
I~ is settled th~t in such a case a suit brought by the person
entitled to the performance of the duty against the official
charged with its performance is not a suit against the government."36
The extent of the adi:niralty jurisdiction was involved in two
cases already dealt with. In Peters v. Veasey,8 7 a longshoreman
a< See 4 MINN L. Rr:v. 364 for a discussion of a provision in the yirginia
constitution held to be self-executing and to give the right to sue the state
and its subdivisions without further legislative action.
""252 U.S. 469, 40 Sup. Ct. 369 (1920) .
.. For consideration of other instances in which suit was resisted as one
against the United States, see 8 CALIF. L. Rr:v. 342, 20 CoLUM. L. Rr:v. 217, 5
<'-0RNELL L. Q. 203, and 33 HARV. L. Rr:v. 322.
31
251 U.S. 121, 40 Sup. Ct. 65 (1919).
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injured on a ship by falling through a hatchway, and in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 38 a bargeman injured when doing unnamed
work said to he ·of a maritime nature, were held not entitled to the
remedies of state ·compensation laws. There appeared to be no
dispute in either case that the injury was within the admiralty jurisdiction. The decision that Congress could not permit the apJ?lica-:
tion of state compensation laws has already been reviewed. 39
The question whether a case is within the federai jurisdiction
because one arising under the Constitution of the United States
necessarily involves an interpretation of the clause of the Constitution relied on by the party who seeks to get into the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has develepod the practice of saying that it
has no jurisdiction to answer frivolous questions or questions already.
completely disposed of. So 1t turns down preposterous objections
by dismissing them for want of jurisdiction. There is, of course,
only a formal difference between such procedure and the alternative
one of entertaining jurisdiction and holding the objection one worth
making but nevertheless ill-founded. Cases in which substantive
federal questions have actually been disposed of have been treated
together in this review, whether or not objection was raised to the
exercise of jurisdiction.
The question whether the suit arose under a law of the United
States was the issue in Pell v. McCabe. 40 This was a bill brought
in the district court to enjoin a suit for fraud against the l)etitioner
who in previous bankruptcy proceedings brought primarily against
others had been determined not to be a general partner and therefore not subject to having his assets administered in the bankruptcy
proceedings. The later suit against him for fraud was held to be
quite independent of anything adjudicated in the bankmptcy proceedings and therefore one properly within the jurisdiction of the
state court and not to be enjoined by the federal court by reason of
its jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. In First National Bank
v. Williams,4 1 however, a suit by a national hank against the comptroller of the currency to enjoin alleged harassing actions on his
""253 U.S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920).
'"19 MrcH. L. Ri;v. 13-14
'°250 U.S. 573, 40 Sup. Ct. 43 (1919).
41
252 U.S. 504, 40 Sup. Ct. 372 (1920).
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part was held to be one in which the right to recover turns on the
construction and application of the National Banking Act, and
therefore one arising 1ender that act, even though not expressly
authorized "by it to be brought. It followed from this that under
another statute the comptroller might be sued in the district where
the bank is located.
In such cases as the foregoing it is often difficult to tell whether
the issue is constitutional or merely one of statutory construction.
'II/heh jurisdiction is entertained, the case is of course within ·the
fe_deral judicial power. But jurisdiction may be denied solely fot:
want of statutory warrant for entertaining it. Sometimes the statutory limits are coterminous with the constitutional limits and
sometimes not. Clearly questions whether the judgment below is
a final one,4 2 whether the federal issue is raised in season,43 whether
"Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U. S. 32, 40 Sup. Ct. 239 (1920), held final an
order of the district court d'enying .an applica'tion to require a .receiver to
tum over property to a receiver appointed by a state court. United States v.
Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 Sup Ct. 289 (1920), held a ruling sustaining a.
motion to quash an indictment to be a "decision or judgment sustaining a
special plea in bar" so as to authorize the government to take a direct writ
of error from the district court to the Supreme Court under the Criminal
Appeals Act. The case held also that the Pennsylvania rule that a grand jury
may not, without leave of court, bring in a new bill on matters previously submitted to another grand jury, is not the common law, as rightly perceived,
and therefore not the rule for federal courts. The federal rule is not statutory, but is the product of the federal court's superior conception of the
common law. The Pennsylvania rule is not adopted as the rule for federal
courts by section 722 of the Revised Statutes, for that applies only in the
absence of a federal rule on the subject. Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 40
Sup. Ct. 347 ( 1920), held a decision of ~e district court not final because it
disposed finally of only a part of the case. The Supreme Court raised of its
own motion the question of the lack of finality. It remarked obiter that the
construction of a treaty by the district court in a final decision is subject to
direct review by the Supreme Court. Oneida Navigation Corporation v. W.
&. S. Job &Co., 252 U. S. 521, 40 Sup. Ct. 357 (1920) held not final the dismissal by the district court of a petition to bring in another defendant alleged
to be liable for a collision. Here again :the Supreme Court raised the question of finality of its own motion. See 33 HARv. L: REv. 1076 for a note on
finality of decision for purposes of appeal.
.. Godchaux Co. v. Estinople, 251 U. S. 179, 40 Sup. Ct. n6 (1920) held
it too late to raise a federal question for the first time on a petition for a rehearing in the state supreme. court, where that court does not actually enter-
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the suit involves ~he requisite amount to be brought in the federal ·
courts/ 4 and \yhether the complaint goes to the validity of some
authority exercised or only to some other right, title or interest
under the federal Constitution or laws,45 are questions . solely of
statutory construction. No constitutional issue seems to be involved
in decisions dismissing a bill because the question raised has become
tain the petition and pass on the objection. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v.
Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 40 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920), affirms the same point, and also
decides that the state decision was final. Hiawassee River Power Co. v.
Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 252 U. S. 341, 40 Sup. Ct. 331 (1920), holds
the federal question presented too late when. first raised on petition for writ
of error filed in the federal Supreme Court. Objection was seasonably raised
to introducing in evidence a charter, but its reception in evidence was held to
violate no federal right.
"Chesbrough v. Northern Trust Co., 252 U.S. 83, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1920),
refused to order the district court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction an
action for tort in which the alleged damages exceeded the prescribed amount
and there was nothing to show that such a recovery was impossible or that
there was bad faith. Scott v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 243, 40 Sup .Ct 503 (1920),
ordered a bill dismissed for want of allegation that the amount in controversy
equals that required by the statute. See 33 HARV. L. Rl>v. 477 for a note on
good faith in alleging the amount in controversy.
••Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 40 Sup. Ct. 133
(1920), note 43, supra, held that the claim that a lease contract was an interstate-commerce contract and therefore not subject to state statutes does not
challenge the validity of the statute so as to justify a writ of error from the
state court, but at most asserts a right, title, or interest under the federal
Constitution which might be the basis for a writ of certiorari. Jett Bros. Co.
v. City of Carrollton, 252 U. S. l, 40 Sup. Ct. 255 (1920), held that a complaint that petitioner's property was assessed at full value while other
property was assessed at thirty or forty per cent of its value does not question the validity of a statute or an authority exercised under it as against the
Constitution of the United States so as to warrant a writ of error. Mr.
Justice Day says that "the mere objection to an exercise of authority under a
statute whose validity is not attacked cannot be made the basis of a writ of
error to this court." This case repeats that it is too late to raise the federal
question on petition for a rehearing in the state court when that court does
not give it consideration. For an extensive note on the consid'erations determining whether writ of error or certiorari is the proper device to bring a
case from the state court to the United States Supreme Court, see 33 HARV.
L. Riw. 102. The cases outlined in the present note and in the two preceding
do not exhaust the list of those in which the Supreme Court considered
similar issues during the past term, but are given merely to illustrate the
blunders that occur in matters of practice.
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tI?-OOt by the amendment of a statute/a or allowing an alien enemy
to proceed as party plaintiff where adequate precautions are taken
against paying a_ judgment to him personally,47 or holding that a
soldier in the army charged_ with tbe murder of a civilian is within
the jurisdiction of a state court even in time of war, since the Articles of War do not clearly make the jurisdiction of the courts martial exclusive. 48 The reports of the decisions of each term are
crowded with disputes on questions of _federal practice. The ignorance and/or the perversity of attorneys impose on the Supreme
Court an excess of unnecessary burden. The burden appears not
only in the cases in which op~nions are written but still more in the
many instances in which decisions are disposed of in a memorandum. Cases of this latter character are not included in this review.
Needless to say, they frequently represent the determination of a
constitutional question. If the question is not regarded by the
Supreme Cottrt as one worth discussing, the reviewer may perhaps
be pardoned for emulating its example.49
~United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. II3, 40 Sup. Ct 448 ( 1920).
"Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 251 U.S. 317, 40 Sup. Ct. 160 (1920) .
.. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 Sup. Ct. 388 (1920).
~·For other discussions of the jurisdiction of the federal courts see
Armistead M. Dobie, "Jurisdiction of the United States District Court as
Affected by Assignment", 6 VA. L. REV. 553, and notes in 33 HARV. L. ~v.
970, g85, and 6 VA. L. REV. 124
Discussions of various aspects of the judicial interpretation of constitutional limitations will be found in George J. Danforth, "The Influence of the
Lawyer upon the Trend of Modern Legislation", 8g CENT. L. J. 392, W. F.
Dodd, "The Problem of State Constitutional Construction", 20 Cor.uM. L.
REV. 635, "Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law",
29 YALE L. J. 137. W. L. Jenks, "Judicial System of Michigan Under the
Governor and Judges"', 18 MICH. L. ~v. 16; Shippen Lewis, "Revising the
Constitution of Pennsylvania", 68 U. PA. L. Rev. 120, Fred A. Maynard,
"Five to Rour Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States", 8g
CENT. L. J. 2o6, William Renwick Riddell, "The Constitutions of the Unitetl
States and Canada", 4 MINN. L. REv. 165, and G. Sweetman Smith, "Judicial
Encroachment upon the Legislative Prerogative". 3 BI. MoN. L. Rev. I.
The practice of foreign countries in respect to declaring laws unconstitutional is considered in 8 CALIF. L. ~v. 91. In 5 CoRNELL L. Q. is a note on
the right of a legislature to validate an act previously declared invalid by
the courts. The duty of federal courts to follow the law of the state in cases
where jurisdiction is obtained' by diversity of citizenship is treated in 20
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Requisites of Jurisdiction 01:er Defendants

The question in Chipman v. Thomas B. Jeffrey Co.Go was whether
a "Wisconsin corporation formerly doing business in New York,
which had complied with the New York statute and designated a
New York agent on whom process against it might be served, is
subject to suit in New York on an extra-New-York cause of action
after it has ceased to do business in New York but before it has
revoked the designation of its New York agent. The case was
started in the New York court and removed to the federal district
court on motion of the defendant. In that court a motion was made
to have the service set aside for lack of jurisdiction over the so-called
person of the defendant. The district judge granted the motion
and his action was affirmed by the Supreme Court. But the reason
given was that the New York courts had said that "unless a foreign
corporation is engaged in business within the state, it is not brought
witliin the state by the presence of Its agents." Of course the
validity of the service depended primarily upon the statute. If the..
statute did not authorize service in the case in question there was
no constitutional issue. The Supreme Court, however, was careful
to guard against any inference that it would have approved of such
an exercise of jurisdiction had it been found warranted by the statute. For Mr. Justice McKenna says th;tt "in resting the case on
the New York decisions we do not wish to be understood that t-lie
validity of such service as here involved would not be of federal
cognizance." Perhaps a hint of what the Supreme Court thinks
about the constitutional issue may be gathered from the comment
that the state court in sustaining service in a case in which the corporation was doing business within the state showed a conscious
solicitude of the necessity of making that the ground of its decision. 5 '·
CoLuM. L. Ri;:v. 612. The requirement that state courts must follow the
federal rule of burden of proof in cases under the federal Employers' Liability Law is discussed in 33 HARV. L. R:ev. 861.
00
251 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920). See 20 CoLm.r. L. Rev. 6!8, 3;
HARV. L. Rev. 730, and 29 YALE L. J. 554.
1
• For notes on jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see 20 CoLUM. L
R:ev. 205, 33 HARV. L. R:ev. II4, 14 ILL. L. R:ev. 653, and 29 YALE L. J. 567
Jurisdiction for divorce or annulment of marriage is treated in 20 CoLUM
L. R:ev. 479, and 5 CORNELL L. Q. 174; service of process on a person in th1
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3. Procedural Requirements
An interesting question touching the inherent powers of federal
courts and' the restriction on those powers by the guarantee of trial
by jury contained in the Seventh Amendment arose in In re Peterson7'2 Judge A. N. Hand of the district court appointed an auditor
in an action at law on a contract, instructed him to examine the
accounts of the parties, gave him power to take testimony and compel the attendance of witnesses, and ordered him to file a report
with the clerk with a view to simplifying the issues for the jury.
The auditor was to make no final determination and his report was to
be mereJy evidence to submit to the jury, which wa5 to retain the
power of final determination of all issues of fact in the case. An
original petition was brought in the S~reme Court for writs of
mandamus and/or prohibition directeel. to Judge Hand to restrain
him from proceeding in this manner and to direct him to restore
the case to the calendar for trial in the usual way. Leave to file the
-petition was granted ;;;:: but, after hearing, the petition was denied.
The Seventh Amendment was held not to forbid changes in practice
or procedure or new methods of determining what facts are in issue.
The auditor·s task of simplifying the issues was called a function
in essence the same as that of pleading. The proposed admission
of his report as evidence was likened to statutory provisions making
the findings of administrative commissions prima facie evidence.
As the jury was to be free to deal with this report as with any
other evidence and the parties were not restricted i~ the introduction of other evidence, the constitutional right to trial by jury was
not impaired. It was recognized that the Seventh Amendment
would forbid a compulsory reference to the auditor with power to
determine any of the issues. As for the source of the power exercised by Judge Hand, the Supreme Court found it in the inherent
powers of courts to take action, not forbidden by statute or Constitution, that will aid them in the performance of their duties.
state on public duty, in 33 HARv. L. Rr:v. 721, 734- See also Emil W. Colombo,
"Service on Parties Fraudulently Brought Within the Jurisdiction", 3 BL
MoNTH. L. Rr:v. 23.
02
253 U. S. 543, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920). See Thomas W. Shelton, "A
-Useful Procedural Innovation-Auditors in Law Cases", gr Cr:NT. L. J. 59.
113
In re Peterson, - - U. S. - - , 40 'Sup. Ct. 178 (1920).
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This inherent power was said to be the same whether the court ~its
in law or in equity. Owing to provisions in the federal statutes, a
discretion reserved by the trial judge as to apportioning the costs
of the enterprise was negatived and it was declared that the expense
must be borne by the losing party. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote the
opinion of the court. Justices McKenna, Pitney and McReynolds
dissented, without opinion.
Several cases involved questions of procedure in the state courts.
Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Cole 54 found it proper for a state to
provide that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk shall in all cases be a question of fact for the jury, since
those defenses might be abolished altogether. Mr. Justice Holmes
declared that a state may do away with the jury altogether, or modify.
its constitution, the procedure before it, or the requirements of a
verdict, "as it may confer legislative and judicial powers upon a
commission not known to the common· law." So, he continued, the
state may confer upon a jury larger powers than those that generally prevail. The cases cited for a number of these propositions
were civil actions, but Mr. Justice Holmes does not include this
qualifi?tion in his recital. The actual decision is of course restricted
to civil actions and is limited by the concluding statement that "in
the present instance the plaintiff in error cannot complain that its
chance to pr:evail upon a certain ground is diminished when the
ground might have been altogether removed." It seemed t9 be conceded that the plaintiff's intestate had been guilty of what was contributory negligence at common law.5 ~
Minor complaints met with short answers in two cases. In Goldsmith v. Prendergast Construction Co. 56 Mr. Justice Day declared
brusquely: "We find no merit in the contention that a federal constitutional right was violated because of the refusal to transfer the
cause from the division of the Supreme Court of Missouri which
heard it to the court in bane." In Lee v. Central of Georgia R'J.'·
.. 251 U.S. 54. 40 Sup: Ct. 68 (1919). See 90 CENT. L. J. 167 and 5 VA.
L. Rte. n. s. 799•
.. The question whether the acquisition of the privilege of voting entitles
women to sit on juries is considered in 90 CENT. L. J. 205 and 68 U. PA. L.
Rr:v. 398. In 68 U. PA. L. Rr:v. 36g is a note on the right to trial by jury in
will ca§es under the Pennsylvania constitution.
'"252 U.S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 273 (1920), 19 M1c:H. L. Rr:v. 129.
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c_o." 7 a plaintiff suing in the state court under the. federal Employers' Liability Law complained because the state practice did not
allow him. to su~ the company and the negligent engineer jointly
in a single count. Mr. Justi~e Brandeis told him that such questions
are normally matters of pleading and _practice relating solely to the
!orm of remedy and therefore wholly questions of state law. Only
when they become matters of substance which affect a federal right,
as in the case of the burden of proof in actions under the Employers' Liability Law/ 8 does the state decision become subject to federal review.
Such questions as that involved in the preceding case might appropriately be classified togethe.r under the head of substantive elements in rights of action, and dealt with under the police power
rather than in the section on judicial procedure. Such a group of
cases would embrace also. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 69
which sustained a Minnesota statute providing that "when a cause of
action has arisen outside of this .state, and, by the laws of the place
where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time,
no· such action shall be maintained in this state unless the plaintiff
be a citizen of this state who has owned the cause of action ever
since it accrued." A North Dakota citizen injured in Canada was
barred from suing in Canada by the Canadian statute of limitations.
He brought his action in Minnesota within the time available for a
Minnesota citizen. He complained that the Minnesota statute which
barred him but did not bar citizens of Minnesota violated the provision in the federal Constitution that '~the citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states." The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with him.
But the Supreme Court said that the provision does not guarantee
citizens of other states absolute· equality with citizens of the state
whose action is questioned, and that the plaintiff had all that he
deserved if he had as long to sue in Minnesota as 1n the country
where he worked and got hurt. For a year he is on an equality with
07

252 U. S. 109, 40 Sup. Ct. 254 (1920) •
.. See Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct.
865 (1915), and New Orleans & N. E. R Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 38
Sup. Ct. 535 (1918).
•• 252 U.S. 553, 40 Sup. Ct. 402 (1920).
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citizens of Minnesota; if he does not avail himself of this eqnality
when he has it, he cannot complain that it does not continue longer,
when the restriction as to him is reasonable in itself. It may be
observed that Mr. Justice Clarke adduces no reasons why a distinction should be made between citizens of Minnesota and those of her
sister states, as the court has done in the other cases when a discrimination has been sanctioned. The case, therefore, seems to stand
for a principle that if citiz-:ns of other states have treatment which
is fair intrinsically, and if they are in no way prejudiced by what is
allowed to citizens of the state whose favor they are seeking, they
cannot complain that a state is kinder to its own citizens than to
others.60

4. Faith and Credit to Proceedings of Sister States
An important question was settled in Kenny v. Supreme Lodge,61
in which Illinois was told that it could not refuse to allow suit in
its courts on a judgment obtained in· a sister state, although th.::
original cause of action could not have been sued on in Illinois. The
Illinois statute provided that no action should be brought in that
state for damages occasion~d by death in another state in consequence of wrongful action. The Illinois court construed this to
forbid suit in Illinois on an Alabama judgment for an Alabama
death, and sustained the statute as constitutional. But the Supreme
Court distinguished the earlier cases allowing a state to refuse suit
on a foreign judgment obtained by one foreign corporation against
another 62 and on a judgment for a penalty for violation of the law
of a sister state,63 and held the case before it governed by an earlier
decision that Mississippi was bound to recognize a Missouri judgment on a Mississippi transaction that was void by the law of Miss.. On the power of a state to close its courts to actions for wrongful
death in other jurisdictions, see 33 HARV. L. R!tv. 727; on closing the courts
to suits between foreign corporations on a foreign cause of action, see 29
Y AI.E L. J. 457.
01
252 U.S. 4u, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (1920). See 29 YAI.E L. J. 812. For notes
on the contrary decision of the state court, see 2 ILL. L. BuLL. 361 and 28
YALE L. J. 264
••Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373,
24 Sup. Ct. 92 (1903) •
.. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370
(1888).
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i~sippi.°' Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that "there is truth in the
proposition that the Constitution does not require the state to furnish a court," but he declared that "it also is true that there arc limits to the p~wer of exclusion and to the power to consider the nature
of the cause of action before the foreign judgment based upon it is
given effect," and that "it is plain that a state cannot escape its
constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise competen,t." An argumer..t
that suit was foreclosed in Illinois bec;anse Alabama provided that
the action could be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction
whhin the state "and nqt elsewhere" was dealt with by saying that
"when the cause of action is created the invalidity of attempts to
limit the jurisdiction of other states to enforc-: it has been established by the decisions of this court," and further that "had these
decisions been otherwise tJ.:iey would not have imported that a judgment rendered exactly as required by the Alabama statute was uot
to have the respect due to other judgments of a sister state."
A question of res adjudicata was decided in Napa Valley Electric
Co. v. California, 65 but as the case involved the credit to be given
to a- stat~ judgment in a federal court, it is not technically an application of the full-faith-and-credit clause. Yet the case is a precedent that would be followed when the second action is brought in
the court of a sister state. Constitutional question's are frequently
questions of common: law which constitutional clauses make matters
of adjudication in the Supreme Court. The Constitqtion brings the
question before the Supreme Court, but does not direct how it shall
be decided. The quarrel ·in the instant case was whether the refusal
of the California Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from the
state railroad commission or to order the record to be certified by
the commission for review in the court was a· final adjudication or
merely a refusal to adjudicate. In holding it to be the former, Mr.
Justice McKenna referred to the "common, and at times necessary,
practice of courts to determine upon the face of a pleading what
action should be taken upon it." It was for the state court to decide
what was proper practice. under the statute-whether it might act
without having the record of the commission before it. The Cali61

Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 ( 1go8).
'"251 U. S. 366, 40 Sup. Ct. 174 (1920).
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fornia cases were thought to show that the state court regarded the
refusal of applications for certiorari to review the orders of the
commission as decisions that those orders are lawful. The refusal
in question was therefore held to be an exercise of judicial power,
and as the refusal was not appealed from, it was held a final judgment which precluded a reexamination of the same issues in a subsequent proceeding.66

IX.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND PROCEDURE

Underlying all questions as to the propriety or the effect of administrative action are the constitutional issues whether the delegation.
of power to the administrative officer is within the restrictions set
by what is left of the principle of the separation of-powers, whether.
the general regulations or the specific findings of the administration
can be accepted as final, and whether the procedure indulged in by
the administration is proper. These questions are frequently interrelated. The finality of administrative adjudications may depend
upon whether they were reached by appropriate methods. The validity of the regulation or order may depend upon the scope of the
power that may be delegated. The requisites of the procedure may
vary with the effect to be ascribed to the action taken. Summary
proceedings may be sanctioned where the action taken is necessarily
.. As the Supreme Court's decision of constitutional issues involving
questions of jurisdiction and of res adjudicata depends often upon its conception of the proper principles of conflict of laws, the following notes and
articles may be of interest to students of constitutional law: on domicil, 20
Cor.uM. L. Ri;v. 87, 33 HARV. L. Ri;v. 863, 18 M1cH. L. RF.v. 331, 332; on law
governing question of capacity, 5 CoRNELI. L. Q. 312, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 612,
726, and Ernest G. Lorenzen, "The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict
of Laws", 20 Cor.uM. L. RF.v. 247; on jurisdiction for divorce and effect of
decree in other states, 20 Cor.uM. L. RF.v. 491, 617, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 729, 4
MINN. L. RF.v. 456, 29 YAI.E L. J. n9; on foreign judgments, 33 HARV. L. RF.v.
984, 18 MICH. L. RF.v. 142, 4 MINN. L. RF.v. 546, Herbert F. Goodrich, ''Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree", 5 IowA L. Bur.L. 230, and Ernest
G. Lorenzen, "The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad", 29 YAU
L. J. 188, 268; on injunction to restrain foreign proceedings, 33 HARv. L. RF.v.
92; on service of process at request of a foreign court, 33 HARv. L. RF.v.
978; on construction or enforcement of foreign statutes, 29 YAI.£ L. J. 230,
329, 798; on proof of foreign law, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 315; on "renvoi", 29
YAI.£ L. J. 214
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sµbject. to judicial review, while more careful investigation is.
required for determinations that may be conclusive. Above all, the
exten~ 6f_,possibl!'! delegation and the propriety of modes of action
vary with. the nature of tlie. inter.-:sts with which the administration
js dealing. Wide delegation and drastic procedure may be proper
when the adniinistration is running .public business or dispensing
public bounty, but improper when it is directly interfering with individual liberty. Indeed, there are few, if any, general principles of
administrative 1aw under our Constitution. Ins~~ad we have one
~et of .rules for -police interferences and other sets of rules for
administrative action in the :exercise of the powers of taxation or
of eminent domain, the conduct of public business or the bestowal
of public privileges.67
The $:ases involving administrative action in the fields of taxation
and of eminent domain ha~e already been reviewed. The wide scope
allowed to administrative authorities in determining the area to be
subjected to a special assessment 1s illustrated by Branson v. Bush68
and Goldsmith v. Prendergast Constrnction, Co.69 The hearing
·afforded. the taxpayer on the question of his proportion of benefit
was held adequate in Fam.comb v. Denver,70 but found doubtful in
Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Pa·ving Co.71 Other questions as to
"the relief open to taxpayers ~aainst alleged unconstitutional levies
81

See John A. Fairlie, "Administrative Legislation", 2 II.L. L. BULL. 373,
and Frederick Green, "Separation of Governmental Powers", 2 ILL. L. BULL.
373, and 29 YALE L. ]. 36g.. Questions oI the delegation of power are considered in 15 ILL. L. REv. 108, 18 MICH. L. REv. 328, and 6 VA. L. fuv. 441.
Various phases of judicial control ovei: administrative action are discussed
in 20 CoLUM. L. RE\'. 97, 33 HARV. L. REv. 462, 478, and 29 YALE L. J. 358,
361. Cases on the liability of officers are dealt with in 19 CoLUM. L. Ritv.
418, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 94. 210, 227, and 29 YALE L. ]. 361. On the power of
equity over public elections, see 29 YALE L. ]. 655; on eligibility of women for
public offic'e, 33 HARV. L. REv. 295; on effect of Nineteenth Amendment on
exclusion of women from juries, 8 VA. L. REv. 589, on right of de jure officer
to salary after payment to de facto officer, 18 MICH.~· REv. 434; on expiration
of term of office, 29 YALE L. ]. n8.
.. 25I U. S. 182, 40 Sup. Ct. II3 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Ri;v. 127.
""252 U. S. I2, 40 Sup. Ct. 273 (I920), I9 MrcH. L. REv. 129.
"°252 U. S. 7, 40 $up. Ct. 271 (1920), 19 MICH. L. REv. 129.
""251 U. S. 104. 40 Sup:Ct. 73 (1919), I9 MICH. L. Rr.v. 129.
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are "co_nsidered in Wallace v. Hines,1 2 Shaffer v. Carter,1 3 Ward v.
Love County,74 and Bradwell v. Carter Count)•,75 though these cases
relate only indirectly to administrative action. Administrative power
and procedure in taking property by eminent domain is considered
in Hays v. Port of Sea:ttle76 and Bragg v. Weaver, 77 which show
that administrative officers may determine the necessity and expediency of the taking, that the taking may precede the determination
of compensation where adequate provision is made for getting
compensation later, and that the property owner is not entitled to a
hearing before the administration on the question of compensation
where the statute allows him to appeal from its award and get a
judicial hearing of the question of what is due him.
Administrative exercise of the police power was involved in a
number of the cases reviewed under that head, and under miscellaneous federal powers and the regulation of commerce. In P emzsylvania R. Co. v. Pennsylvanial8 it was declared that a state cannot
give a public service commission power to do what the laws of the
United States forbid, whether its action be called administratiYe
or judicial. Several of the cases dealing with public utilities show
that an administrative order is subject to all the judicial scmtiny
that would be visit<:;d on a direct legislative prescription. The
requirement that administrative action regulating rates must be so
exercised as to afford to the victim a fair opportunity to contest the
reasonableness of the rates before a judicial tribunal was passed
upon in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,1° Ohio Valley
fVater Co. v. Ben A·von Borough, 80 Oklahoma Operating Co. v.
Love/;1. and Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahonia. 82 The reasonableness
of rates prescribed by a commission was reviewed in Grosbeck v.
"'253
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66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435 (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. 30, I2I.
37, 40 Sup. Ct. 22I (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I24I7, 40 Sup. Ct. 4I9 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I33·
25, 40 Sup. Ct. 422 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Rsv. I33.
233, 40 Sup. Ct. I25 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I49·
57, 40 Sup. Ct. 63 (19I9), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I49·
566, 40 Sup. Ct. 36 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. REv. 27.
63, 40 Sup. Ct. 71 (I919), I9 MICH. L. Rr.'Y. I4I.
287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (I920),I9 MicH. L. R.Ev. 142.
331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920), 19 MICH. L. Ritv: 143.
339, 40 Sup. Ct. 341 (1920), 19 MicH. L. REv. 143.
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D_uluth, S.S. & A. Ry. Co. 83 An industrial commission's award of
damages for permanent facial disfigurement was sustained in New
York Centr:al Ry._ Co. v. Bianc. 84 The jurisdiction and procedure of
the Federal Trade Commission was considered in Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz. 85 The internal law of administration was
involved in Burnap v. United States,sr. which dealt with the removal
of federal officers. In Houston v. Onnes81 a suit against the Secretary of the Treasury was held not to be a suit against the United
States.88
While the federal government has no police power as such, it
often uses its :r.ecognized powers for police purposes. Indeed, the
term federal police power has now won recognition even from the
Supreme Court. Several administrative exercises of this so-called
federal police power were questioned in cases decided during the
past term. In United St(ltes v. Standard Brewery/9 which held
that the War Prohibition Act of 1918 applied only to intoxicating
liquors, it was laid down that contrary rulings of the internal r~v
enue department could not alter the terms of the statute and make
conduct criminal which the statute does not. In Chicago, .W. & St.
P. R'y. Co. v. McCa.iill-Dinsmore Co. 99 it was declared that the question whether a stipulation in an interstate bill of lading violates the
federal statute against limiting liability for loss is a question of b,,,.
""250 U. S. 6o7, 40 Sup. Ct. 38 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Rr:\'. 140.

"'250 U. S. 596, 40 Sup. Ct. 45 (19I9), I9 MICH. L. Ri;v I45·
""253 U. S. 42I, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (I920), 19 :MICH. L. Rm-. 23, note 39·
.. 252 U.S. 512, 40 Sup. Ct. 374 (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I8.
87
252 U. S. 469, 40 Sup. Ct. 369 (I920), supra, p. 302.
M For a note on Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. White Co., 250 U. S. 45, 39
Sup. Ct. 393 (I9I9), on the subject of suits against the United States under
the Tucker Act, see 29 Y ALe L. J. I25. For other discussions of the liability
of a government for the acts of its officers, see I9 CoLUM. L. RF.v. 407, 5
CORNELL L. Q. 78, 338, 33 HARV. L. Rev. 7I3, 735, I8 MICH. L. Rev. 433, and
George DeForest Lord, "Admiralty Claims Against the Government'', I9
CoLuz-1. L. Rev. 465. For comment on the tort liability of municipal corporations see 20 CoLUM. L. R£V. 619, 620, 5 CORNELi. L. Q. 90, IS MICH. L. Rev.
7o8, 29 Y ALe L. J. II7, 9n. The contractual powers and liabilities of municipal corporations are treated in 20 CoLUM. L. Rev. 336, 349, and 29 YALe L. J.
364. On another phase of the law of municipal corporations, see Richard W.
Montague, "Law of Municipal Home Rule in Oregon", 8 CAI.IF. L. Rr:v. 15I.
"'25J U. S. 210, 40 Sup. Ct. 139 (I920) .
..,253 U. S. 97, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (I920).
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which the courts must decide for themselves, regardless of any
determination by the Interstate Cotnmerce Commission that the
stipulati~n in question is reasonable.
The effect to be given to a reparation order of the Interstate Commerce Commission was considered in Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co.91 The statute provided that the order of the commis:,ion
that reparation is due the shipper should be prinia facie evidence in
actions brought by him against the carrier in courts. The carrier
based his objections to such weight being accorded to the commission's findings on the ground that its procedure was unduly lax.
Its reception of hearsay evidence was overlooked, not on the ground
that it was entitled to accept such evidence, but for the reason that
the carrier had failed to object to its reception on the ground of
hearsay during the hearing before the commissioner. Yet the opinion hints that the commission has wide latitude in the matter of
evidence, especially when its findings . are made only prima facie
evidence. It was explicitly declared that where the essential facts
found by the commission are based on substantial evidence, and
there has been no denial of the right to a fair hearing, its findings
and order will not be rejected because improper evidence was admitted or the best possible available evidence was not produced or
because a different conclusion might have been reached.
Two more important cases protected Chinamen from deportation
orders of immigration.officials. Both involved Chinamen who had
previously been. in the United States and were returning to the
United States after a temporary visit ·to China. White v. Ching
Fong 92 involved an alien who was conceded by the administrat;ve
authorities to have been previously in thi~ country, but who was
ordered deported on the strength of an administrative finding that
his original entry was unlawful. A ~vrit of habeas corpus was
a warded on the ground that under the statute a Chinese person
already in the United States is entitled to a judicial determination
of his right to remain and that this right is not lost by a temporary
visit to China. His situation upon his return is not that of one first
seeking to enter.
01

253 U. S. II7, 40 Sup. Ct. 466 (1920).
"'253 U.S. 90, 40 Sup. Ct. 449 (1920).
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. Kwack Jan Fat v. White 93 had to do with a claim to citizenship.
Here the petitioner while in this country and intending to visit
China file4 an application as provided by law for a "preinvestig-c1.tion of his claimed status ·as an American citizen." The investigation resuited in an official determination that he was an American
citizen. During his absence in China anonymous communicatioris
to the commissioner of immigration started a new investigation, and
upon his return he was denied entry. Objections to the hearing
accorded on this occasion included the facts that the examining
i~spector submitted to the commissioner as evidence statements
reported to be made by unnamed persons, that a demand by the
petitioner for the names was refused, and that the examining inspector failed to record in the testimony taken the fact that thi> three
white persons of reputable character who testified to the petitioner's
American citizenship were confronted with him an<l recognized him
as the boy they had knowri in his youth. These allegations were
admitted by demurrer. V/hile the court indicated disapproval of
the reception in evidence of unswom statements by unnamed persons, it stated that in view of the declaration by the commissioner
that this report did not influence his decision, it might not say that
this "rendered the hearing so manifestly unfair as to require reversal, if there were nothing else objectionable in the record." But the
failure to record the. fact that there was mutual recognition between
the petitioner and the three white witnesses was held enough to
entitle the petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus. While the decision
goes on the ground that the hearing did not fulfil the requirements
of the statute, it is likely that the court wot.!ld hold, if necessary,
that a fair hearing on the question. of citizenship is essential to d11e
process of law. Having found the administrative hearing unfair,
the Supreme Court ordered the di~trict court to hear and determine
the quest~on of citizenship on its merits, after the practice approved
in an earlier case.H It would seem that under the Chin Fong case,
just considered, the petitioner was also entitled to a judicial hearing
"'253 U. S . .454. 40 Sup. Ct. 566 (1920).
H Chin How v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (1go8).
For
a discussion of this procedure see "Judicial Review of Administrative Action
in Immigration Proceedings'.', 32 HARV. L. Rtv. 360.
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because he had concededly been a long-time resident prior to his
recent visit to China.
Plainly greater latitude is allowed administrative officers in action
which decides only whether individuals are entitled to the benefits
conferred by statutes. Thus, in United States v. Lane9 ~ the court
accepted without question the finding of the land department that
work done by a prospector was not enough to entitle him to .privileges open to those who have "opened or improved"· a coal mine.
Mr. Justice McKenna said that, where there is discretion, the finding of the land department, though disputable, is impregnable to
mandamus. So, in Cameron v. United States96 it was held that the
findings of the Secretary of the Interior that a tract covered by a
mineral location is not mineral land, and that there had been no
sufficient discovery, are conclusive, in the absence of fraud or imposition. United States v. Poland&r held that where a land patent was
issued by land officers in violation of the statute the government is
entitled to have it canceled unless a successor of the patentee is a
bona fide purchaser. A patent was also canceled in United States
v. Southern Pacific Co. 95 In this same group may be put Natio1ial
Lead Co. v. United States, 90 which accepted the interpretation of
the Treasury Department that the drawback allowed on exportation
of products from raw materials previously imported should, when
more than one product is derived from those materials, be apportioned according to the relative value of the respective products and
not according to their relative weight. This was an instance where
the administration had to fill in a gap in the statute. Though in
the particular case the court plainly thought the administrative
ruling right in itself, it often shows an inclination not to substitute
its opinion for that of the administration, particularly when the
complainant is in the position of looking a gift horse in the month.
Several cases involved administrative determinations in the course
of carrying on government business. Grand Trunk U7estern R·y.
"'250 U.S. 549, 40 Sup. Ct. 33 (1919).
00
252 U.S. 450, 40 Sup. Ct. 410 (1920).
01
251 U.S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 127 (1920) .
..,251 U. S. l, 40 Sup. Ct. 47 (1919). See 20 Cor.uM. L.
•252 U.S. 140, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1g2o).
.

~v.
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Cp. v. United States100 refused to give weight to a long-continued
administrative construction that a certain statute relating to overpayments f_or carrying the mails does not apply to a certain railroad,
where this construction was due to a mistake of fact as to whether
the road "in question was i~ the class of the land-aided roads. In
Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. United States101 it was held that the failure of the Postmaster General to fine companies for less than twentyfour hours' delay in delivery of the mails is not to be taken as an
administrative construction that the statute empowered him to
impose fines only when the delay exceeds twenty-four hours. N cw
York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. United States102 accepted the administrative practice of weighing "the mails only once in four years, as
warranted by the letter of the statute. The Mail Divisor Cases103
held railroads bound by the average weight of mails determined by
the administration. Only four of the judges thought that the
method employed was warranted by the statute, but two others held
the statute directory only and not mandatory. and thought that, since
the Postm~ster General had discretion as to the rate of pay and
as the companies had carried the mails on his terms when they were
not by law obliged to, they were bound by the conditions under
which they undertook the service. In Eastern E.-rtension, Australasia & Clzina Tel. Co. v. United States104 and E. W. Bliss Co. v.
United States10 a the court had to consider whether the action of
administrative officers .had been such as to create a claim against
the government on which it would be subject to suit in the court of
claims.106
Two cases involved administrative dealings with the Indian tribes.
United States v. Omaha Tribe of lndians 101 denied recovery' against
100

252 U.S. u2, 40 Sup. Ct. 309 (1920).
252 U.S. 147, 40 Sup. Ct. 257 (1920).
10
'251 D. S. 123, 40 Sup. Ct. 67 (1919). Mr. Justice Brandeis dissents.
See 29 Y ALS L. J. 666.
103
251 U.S. 326, 40 Sup. Ct. 162 (1920). Justices Day and Van Devanter
1
"'

dissent. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not sit.
10
' 251 U. S. 355, 40 Sup. ·Ct. 168 (1920).
""' 253 U. S. 187, 40 Sup. Ct. 455 ( 1920).
100
For references to discussions of claims against governments see note
88, supra.
0
' ' 253 U. S. 275, 40 Sup. Ct. 522 (i920).
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the 'United States for d-:predations committed by a hostile tribe, and
held that the agreement in a treaty to give protection so long as the
President may deem it necessary imposed no liability in the absence
of a finding that there was failure to provide such protection as the
President deemed necessary. The case illustrates the principle that
a right dependent upon administrative action cannot arise unless
the requisite action is taken. United States v. Payne108 held that
the Secretary of .the Interior is the final judge of whether names
shall be enrolled as members of the Creek Nation and that until he
has taken final action he qiay abandon his preliminary conclusions.
The Secretary had written the commissioner approving his report,
bnt he was allowed to rescind this without giving any hearing or
adducing any reasons. Such action prior to any actual enrollment
was held not to deny due process of law.
Two other cases accepted long-continued administrative constructions of statutes. Ash Sheep Co. v. United States100 adopted the
administrative conclusion that "cattle" includes sheep. in view of
warrant in the dictionaries aided by the presumption that Congress
would have amended the statute had it disliked the administrative
interpretation of its scope. In Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson110 Mr. Justice Pitney declared:
"Whatever view we might entertain, were the matter res
nova., we are advised that by the practice and administ.rative
rulings of the Comptro1ler of the Currency during a long
period, if not from the beginning of national banking, 1iabilities which are incurred by one person avowedly and in fact
as surety or as indorser for money borrowed by another arc
not included in the computation. We feel constrained to
accept this as a practical construction of the section. "" * *"
The question arose in a suit by a national bank against one of its
offic-:rs for loaning amounts in excess of that permitted by the
statute to a single borrower.
10

•253 U. S. 209, 40 Sup. Ct. 513 (1920).
252 U.S. 159, 40 Sup. Ct. 241 (1920).
110
251 U. S. 68, 40 Sup. Ct. 82 (1919).
100

MICHIGAN LAW REVlEW

X.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Several of the cases already reviewed involve relations between
the states and the United States. In Hawke v. Smith 111 and National
Prohibiticm Cases112 it was settled that a state legislature acts as a
federal agency in passing upon proposed amendments to ..the federal
Constitution, and that therefore a state cannot subject the action
of .the legislature to a referendum. Evans v. National Bpnk of
Savannah113 illustrates the familiar rule that national banks are subject to state control only to the extent permitted by.Congress,. Ervien
v.· United States114 shows that a stipulation in an enabling act as to
the use to be made of lands .therein granted to the thereby newlycreated state is binding. on the state after it attains a full-fledged
status and will he enforced by the federal courts. United States v.
Osage Coimty 115 lets the United States as guardian of Indians sue
in a federal court to protect its wards from wrongful state taxation. Dulm~ v. New Jersey116 holds that th~ original jurisdiction
.of the Supreme Court in controversies to which a state is a party
is confined· to cases in which the federal judicial power extends to
suits against a state, and therefore does not include a suit sought
to be brought against a state by one of its citizens.117
Relations between states brought ~everal cases to the Supreme
Court. Questions of fact with regard to boundaries w~re adjudicated in .Minnesota v. 117isconsin118 and Arkansas v. 111ississippi.119
In Ohio v. West Virginia120 and Penns'ylvania v. T¥ est Virginia121
U. S. 22I, 40 Sup. Ct. 495 (I920), I9 MrcH. L Rr:v. 2.
U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 ( I920), I9 MICH. L. Rtv. 4.
U. S. 108, 40 Sup. Ct. 58 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Rr:v. 18.
U. S. 4I, 40 Sup. Ct. 75 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REY. 16.
U. S. 128, 40 Sup. Ct. 100 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REY. 17.
U. S. 3n, 40 Sup. Ct. 154 ( 1920), supra, p. 301.
11
' A question of intergovernmental relations is considered in M. G. Wallace, "Taxation by the States of United States Bonds Held by Corporations",
6 VA. L. Rr:v. 20.
'"252 U. S. 273, 40 Sup. Ct. 314 (I920).
tn252 U. S. 344, 40 Sup. Ct. 333 (1920).
On such questions of fact as those iqvolved in this and in the preceding
case, see Harvey Hoshour, "Boundary Controversies Between States Bordering on a Navigable River", 4 MINN. L. Rr:v. 463.
100
252 U.S. 563, 40 Sup. Ct. 357 (1920).
ttt252 U.S. 563, 40 Sup. ·Ct. 357 (1920).
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the court granted motions to consolidate the cases for the purpose
of taking testimbny, and appointed a commissioner for that purpose. Four cases each styled Oklahoma v. Texas1 22 dealt with
petitions to intervene or granted leave to file them. One issued an
order granting an injunction and appointing a receiver, and another
issued an order instructing the receiver.
Columbia University.
THOMAS REED POWELL.
=252 U. S. 372, 40 Sup. Ct. 353 (1920); 253 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 58o,

s&>. 582

(1920).

